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Abstract. The traditional way of dealing with uncertainty in population projections through high and 
low variants is unsatisfactory because it remains unclear what range of uncertainty these alternative 
paths are assumed to cover. But probabilistic approaches have not yet found their way into official 
population projections. This paper proposes an expert-based probabilistic approach that seems to 
meet important criteria for successful application to national and international projections: 1) it 
provides significant advantages to current practice, .2) it presents an evolution of current practice 
rather than a discontinuity, 3) it is scientifically sound, and 4) it is applicable to all countries. 
In a recent Nature article (Lutz et al., 1997) this method was applied to 13 world regions. 
This paper discusses the applicability to national projections by directly taking the alternative 
assumptions defined by the Austrian Statistical Office. Sensitivity analyses that resolve some 
methodological questions about the approach are also presented. 
Lutz, W. et Scherbov, S., 1998, Une approche sous contr6le d 'experts pour des projections 
probabilistes de populations nationales: l 'exemple de I' Autriche. Revue Europeenne de Demographie 
14: 1-17. 
Resume. La fa<;on traditionnelle de traiter de !'incertitude dans !es projections de population, en 
introduisant des variantes hautes et basses, est peu satisfaisante, car ces variantes ne couvrent pas 
un domaine clairement defini. Les approches probabilistes n 'ont pas encore trouve leur voie dans 
!es projections officielles de population. Cet article propose une approche probabiliste basee sur une 
expertise, qui semble reunir des criteres importants pour une bonne application a des projections, 
tant nationales, qu 'internationales: 1) el le fournit des a vantages significatifs par rapport aux pratiques 
courantes; 2) elle presente une evolution de ces pratiques plut6t qu ' une discontinuite; 3) elle a des 
bases scientifiques claires; et 4) elle est applicable a tous Jes pays. 
Dans un article recent de Nature (Lutz et al., 1997) cette methode a ete appliquee a 13 regions 
du monde. Cet article discute de son application a des projections nationales, en prenant directement 
en compte Jes hypotheses alternatives faites pas I 'Office statistique autrichien. II presente aussi des 
analyses de sensibilite qui permettent de resoudre certains problemes methodologiques lies a cette 
approche. 
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1. Introduction and approach 
One major unresolved issue in population projection is how to deal with uncer-
tainty. This concerns both the handling of uncertainty in the calculations and the 
presentation of probabilistic results to the users. 
There is little doubt among users and producers alike that it is meaningful to 
produce at least one 'medium', or 'central', projection that is somehow considered 
the best projection at the time of production. For many users such a best guess 
will suffice. They typically take it as an exogenous input into their own models for 
school planning, social security considerations, energy outlook, etc. These projec-
tions may tum out to be wrong due to unforeseen circumstances, but given our 
knowledge today they reflect the best assumptions we can make. Hence a medium 
projection should be an indispensable part of any set of published projections. 1 
It has become practice by the UN and many national statistical agencies to 
publish, in addition to the medium projection, 'variants' that are generally based on 
higher and lower fertility paths. But in the publications themselves or elsewhere in 
the demographic literature, it is difficult to find exact definitions of what such 'vari-
ants' actually stand for. Are they just sample paths, or do they demarcate certain 
ranges? The only thing that is sometimes explicitly stated is that they should not 
be interpreted as giving any sort of confidence intervals in a probabilistic sense. 
But this is exactly what most users take them to be, and we cannot blame them 
because an uncertainty distribution is the only logical interpretation of any set of 
'high', 'medium', and 'low' lines published. To an informed non-demographer, 
e.g. a scholar from another scientific discipline, who is unfamiliar with the tradi-
tional practice of demographers, an immediate question will be, whether the range 
given by the variants is assumed to cover 100 per cent, 90 per cent, or any other 
proportion of all possible future paths. But the demographic producers generally 
refuse to be precise about their subjective probability distribution, and do not give 
the user a satisfactory answer to this crucial question. But what should the user do 
with the variants if he is not told how to interpret them? 
In addition to this lack of precision in what one is actually doing, there seem to 
be two other serious problems with the traditional 'variants': 
1) They are in many cases still based only on variations in fertility assumptions 
(as spearheaded by the published UN projections) and disregard uncertainty 
about future mortality and migration trends, which also impact on population 
size and even more so age distributional aspects such as on the old-age de-
pendency ratio. For such ratios the uncertainty range due to mortality may be 
more significant than that due to fertility. 
2) The high/low variants presented for the total world population or groups of 
countries are based on the assumption that in all countries fertility trends 
simultaneously follow the maxima/minima defined for each country.2 This 
is a very unreasonable assumption. In reality, in some countries fertility will 
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be above the assumed average, and in others below. For the global total pop-
ulation size these diverging trends will partly cancel out. Because of these 
compensations the global population size is by orders of magnitude less likely 
to hit the value given under the 'high' variant than it is in any particular 
country, no matter what likelihood is assumed for each country. 
What are the possible ways around such serious problems? One can go in either 
of two directions: The first approach is explicitly to call the alternative projections 
sample paths or scenarios designed to demonstrate the consequences of certain 
specified conditions. A constant fertility scenario is an example of this, where there 
is no need to specify a probability because it is only for illustrative purposes. Some 
of IIASA's (Lutz, 1994) scenarios (such as the 'African Food Crisis Scenario') 
followed this direction. For the UN it would be an interesting attempt to specify a 
scenario that would demonstrate the long-term impacts of a successful implemen-
tation of the quantitative goals of the 'Cairo Programme of Action' in the fields 
of health and unmet need for family planning. The current 'low' variant certainly 
does not reflect such a scenario (since it does not assume extra efforts in health), 
although one sometimes hears this association. 
The other direction is to systematically consider possible deviations from the 
most likely path for all three components. This can, on the one hand, be done 
by applying errors from past population projections or making assumptions about 
variance derived from past time series, or on the other hand, by having experts 
define ex ante probability distributions. While most of the literature on probabilistic 
population projections so far follows the first approach (Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1994; 
Lee, 1993; Keilman and Cruijsen, 1992; Lee and Carter, 1992; Alho, 1990; Alho 
and Spencer, 1985) this contribution chooses to go the other way. 
A recent article in Nature (Lutz et al., 1997) presents probabilistic world and 
regional population projections that make use of expert opinion on both the trends 
in fertility, mortality, and migration, and on the uncertainty range of those trends. 
Using simulation techniques the authors have derived distributions of population 
sizes and age structures from those expert judgements. The range of uncertainty 
was defined in terms of three values (central, low, and high) for each component 
for a given year (2030) where the area between 'low' and 'high' should cover 90 
per cent of all possible cases. Due to limited space, two important methodological 
issues of this approach could not be discussed in that article: 
1) It needs to be studied to what degree results depend on the precision of the 
expert statement about the 90 per cent range; in other words, does it make 
much difference if the low-high interval is alternatively taken to cover 85 per 
cent or 95 per cent? 
2) Caution has been expressed (see Lee, 1998) that the assumption of piece-wise 
linear random paths, e.g. in total fertility rates, from the starting point to the 
end point underestimates the variance of the resulting population age distrib-
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ution in comparison to a presumably more realistic random path of short-term 
fluctuations with some degree of autocorrelation. 
These two methodological issues will be discussed using Austrian data and 
will, in our view, receive satisfactory answers that suggest the method for broader 
applications also in the field of national population projections. More importantly, 
using the alternative assumptions of the most recent official Austrian population 
projections produced by the Central Statistical Office, this paper also illustrates 
how these 'conventional' projections can directly be converted into a probabilistic 
framework that provides a more meaningful way of stating uncertainty than the 
traditional way of publishing variants. By directly taking the assumptions as 
already defined by national experts for the official statistics, and simply assum-
ing a standard normal distribution over those fertility, mortality, and migration 
assumptions (which happen to be symmetric),3 we believe that this approach is a 
more likely candidate for implementation by statistical offices than complex time-
series based approaches that require a number of structural and parameter choices 
which are not intuitively clear, in addition to detailed time series data which are not 
available for many countries in the world. 
2. Probabilistic population projections for Austria 
In 1996 the Austrian Central Statistical Office published a new population projec-
tion to 2050. Assumptions were defined in the usual way by discussing in an 
inter-agency meeting proposals prepared by the projections unit. Because inter-
national migration has been playing a very important role in Austria recently, the 
committee decided to implement three alternative migration assumptions, namely, 
annual net migration gains of 10,000, 17 ,000, and 24,000 to be effective in the first 
projection year and stay constant during the whole projection period. In contrast 
to migration, fertility has been very stable in Austria over the past 15 years, with 
a total fertility rate of between 1.5 and 1.4. At present, it is at 1.4 and is assumed 
to increase to 1.5 by 2010 under the central assumption. In the high and low cases 
it is assumed to reach 1.8 and 1.2, respectively. 4 Values up to 2010 are derived by 
linear interpolation. Beyond that fertility is kept constant.5 Life expectancy for men 
is assumed to increase from presently 74 years to 79 years in 2030 under the central 
assumption (76 and 82 years under low and high). For women over the same period 
it is assumed to rise from 80 to 85 years in the central, 83 in the low and 87 in the 
high case.6 
The combination of the three central assumptions forms the basis for the official 
medium variant. Results of this projection indicate that after 2001 the balance of 
births and deaths will tum negative and remain so at an ever-increasing magnitude 
over the whole projection period. In 2015 the deficit will reach 1.2/1000, in 2030 
3.0/1000, and in 2050 8.0/1000, which means an absolute deficit of more than 
60,000. It is only due to assumed net migration gains that the total population size 
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will continue to grow from presently 8.0 million to 8.4 million in 2025. This is 
projected to be the turning point after which population will start to decline rather 
rapidly due to the increasing birth deficit that then will outweigh immigration. 
Throughout the period population ageing will rapidly advance with the proportion 
above age 60 increasing from presently 19.7 per cent to way above 30 per cent, and 
the mean age of the population increasing from presently 38.5 years to close to 50 
years. 
Hence, there is no doubt that Austria will experience very significant population 
ageing. But the extent and speed of ageing crucially depends on future fertility, 
mortality, and migration trends. There is significant uncertainty about the future 
paths of these demographic components, as already described above, through the 
alternative assumptions made. Instead of discussing here the results of alterna-
tive projections combining various assumptions, we will immediately present the 
results of 1000 simulation runs that randomly combine different fertility, mortal-
ity, and migration paths from the above described normal distributions for each 
component.7 This is done by drawing a value for the target year of each compo-
nent and using the linearly interpolated values for the intermediate years (in the 
same way the original variants were defined), see also Hanika et al., 1997. Each 
simulation run is therefore based on three random draws, one for each component, 
an approach that has been labelled the 'random scenario approach' by Lee (1998). 
Figure 1 shows selected fractiles of the resulting distribution in total population 
size. The inner 20 per cent (dark shaded area) follow the path described above 
for the main variant: an increase to 2025 followed by a decline in total population 
size. The inner 60 per cent of the resulting distribution still covers a relatively 
narrow range over the next two decades, but then starts to open up markedly. The 
corresponding data are given in Table 1. In 2025 the range covers approximately 
half a million potential Austrians; in 2050 it is already far above 1 million. The 
95 per cent interval shows a similar trumpet shape with a difference of around 1 
million in 2025 and close to 3 million in 2050. In other words, the specified expert-
based model implies that with a probability of 95 per cent the Austrian population 
in 2025 will lie between 7.8 and 8.9 million, and in 2050 between 6.5 and 9.2 
million. The results also show that with a probability of around 60 per cent the 
population in 2050 will be lower than today, while in roughly 40 per cent of all 
simulations population size turns out to be greater than today. 
To characterise the results with respect to population ageing, in Figure 2 the 
uncertainty distribution for the old-age dependency ratio is depicted. Unlike with 
population size above there is no doubt about the direction of change. Even the 
lower bound of the 95 per cent interval shows significant increases in old-age 
dependency. The inner 60 per cent range from a doubling of the ratio to an increase 
by a factor of 2.4 by the year 2050. This is a much smaller range of uncertainty 
than with population size partly because the migration factor is less important. 
The social implications of alternative degrees of population ageing are likely 
to be significant, at least in terms of financial difficulties of the pension system. 
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Figure 1. Fractiles of resulting distribution for total population size in Austria 1995 to 2050. 
Table 1. Resulting uncertainty distributions for population size and the old-age dependency ratio for 
Austria 1995 to 2050 
Percentiles 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
A. Total population size 
2.5% 8.040 8.127 8.127 8.069 7.977 7.883 7.765 7.600 7.385 7.126 6.816 6.475 
20.0% 8.040 8.141 8.181 8.189 8.166 8.140 8.088 8.000 7.880 7.713 7.506 7.264 
40.0% 8.040 8.148 8.209 8.245 8.267 8.279 8.272 8.228 8.141 8.020 7.867 7.682 
60.0% 8.040 8.154 8.233 8.291 8.339 8.381 8.404 8.394 8.349 8.271 8.164 8.026 
80.0% 8.040 8.161 8.258 8.341 8.424 8.495 8.550 8.584 8.586 8.556 8.509 8.433 
97.5% 8.040 8.173 8.306 8.443 8.583 8.726 8.859 8.970 9.055 9.121 9.174 9.219 
Mean 8.040 8.151 8.220 8.265 8.299 8.322 8.327 8.300 8.236 8.139 8.013 7.855 
Median 8.040 8.151 8.220 8.267 8.301 8.323 8.326 8.295 8.223 8.123 7.996 7.835 
St. dev. 0.000 0.011 0.045 0.092 0.149 0.208 0.271 0.340 0.417 0.502 0.591 0.682 
B. Old-age dependency ratio 
2.5% 0.315 0.321 0.348 0.360 0.378 0.416 0.483 0.550 0.578 0.569 0.566 0.554 
20.0% 0.315 0.321 0.350 0.365 0.386 0.429 0.504 0.583 0.621 0.622 0.631 0.631 
40.0% 0.315 0.321 0.351 0.367 0.390 0.436 0.516 0.599 0.642 0.647 0.662 0.671 
60.0% 0.315 0.322 0.353 0.370 0.394 0.442 0.524 0.613 0.661 0.672 0.694 0.708 
80.0% 0.315 0.322 0.354 0.372 0.398 0.448 0.536 0.632 0.689 0.706 0.736 0.763 
97.5% 0.315 0.323 0.356 0.378 0.406 0.462 0.558 0.666 0.738 0.774 0.828 0.883 
Mean 0.315 0.322 0.352 0.369 0.392 0.439 0.520 0.607 0.654 0.664 0.684 0.697 
Median 0.315 0.322 0.352 0.369 0.392 0.439 0.519 0.606 0.651 0.659 0.677 0.688 
St. dev. 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.019 0.030 0.041 0.052 0.066 0.082 
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Figure 2. Fractiles of resulting distribution for the old-age dependency ratio in Austria, 1995 
to 2050. 
Put in a nutshell, the Austrian pay-as-you-go system already has serious coverage 
problems, and receives one-fourth of its funds from the general budget, although 
there are still only 31 elderly (above age 60) for 100 adults (15 to 60). The median 
projections show an increase to 52/ 100 by 2025 and 69/ 100 in 2050. In other words, 
in 2050 there are likely to be 7 elderly for 10 adults in working age. But these 
demographic dependency ratios are still more favourable than the actual economic 
dependencies, because young men and women do not start to contribute to the 
system at age 15 (and education is increasing rather than declining), and a certain 
proportion of that age group will stay out of the labour force or be unemployed. 
Hence, the actual ratio of contributors to beneficiaries of the pension system is 
likely to deteriorate even more strongly, unless there is a radical increase in the 
mean age of retirement, which in Austria is now as low as 57 years even for men. 
Every percentage point in the old-age dependency ratio means that billions of 
Austrian schillings are available or not available in the Austrian pension system. 
Hence, for the planning of a reformed pension system, it will make some difference 
whether in 2040 the ratio is 64 per cent or 67 per cent (the inner 20 per cent of the 
distribution). It will make a very significant difference whether it is at 57 per cent 
or 77 per cent (the 95 per cent interval). Seen in another way, these probabilistic 
projections can help the designers of the new pension system to construct it in a 
way that it will have a certain probability of not crashing. If the system should be 
viable with a probability of 80 per cent, then it should be able to handle an old-
age dependency ratio of 71/100 in 2040. If politicians feel more confident with a 
system that will not crash in 97.5 per cent of all cases, they must make it still more 
efficient to handle even a dependency ratio of 77/100. Or put in still another way: 
If a ratio of 601100 (which is about twice the dependency burden of today) is the 
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Figure 3. Fractiles of resulting distributions of the Austrian age pyramid in 2050. 
point when a given system will crash, we can derive from our model that with a 
probability of 60 per cent, it will have crashed by 2030 and that there is only a 
probability of about 5 per cent that it will not crash before 2050. 
Figure 3 shows the fractiles of the uncertainty distributions in 2050 for the full 
age pyramid. It clearly indicates that the distribution is widest at the younger ages 
due to the uncertainty about future fertility. Especially under age 25, the fertility 
uncertainty enters twice because we are talking about the children of mothers still 
to be born. Uncertainty is lowest between ages 55 and 70 in 2050 because these 
cohorts are already born and have not yet entered the ages of highest mortality. 
During those higher ages the uncertainty about future life expectancy is clearly 
reflected in increasing dispersion. For many planning issues related to specific age 
groups this kind of representation of future uncertainty may be more relevant than 
that of aggregate dependency ratios. 
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3. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we will address two issues that are potential points of criticism 
of the above-described method of probabilistic population projections based on 
expert opinion. The first issue concerns the 90 per cent confidence intervals that 
are defined by experts in order to specify the magnitude of fertility, mortality, and 
migration variation. Since some experts may not be able to provide such specific 
intervals we will test the sensitivity of the results with respect to the alternative 
assumptions of 85 per cent and 95 per cent intervals. 
The second issue deals with the algorithm of scenario generation and the impact 
of short-term fluctuations. As has been mentioned above, we apply a random 
scenario approach introduced in Lutz et al. (1996, 1997). Lee (1998), however, 
conjectures with respect to this approach that it 'could not possibly correctly 
represent the probability distribution for the age structure (dependency ratios, for 
example) or for any other measure that depends on the shapes of vital rates trajec-
tories .... [T]he evidence is not yet in.' In order to shed more light on this issue, we 
tried to conduct a systematic analysis of this question by means of simulation since 
the problem is difficult to solve analytically due to the complexity of the Leslie 
matrix. Essentially, we compare the results of the random scenario approach with 
an alternative approach based on adding an auto-regressive random component 
with a given autocorrelation to the process, as will be described in detail below. 
There are several other issues worth testing. The selection of a certain proba-
bility distribution (normal, uniform or some asymmetric distribution) also impacts 
on the results of the simulation. But since earlier sensitivity analysis (Lutz et al., 
1996) has shown that the normal and uniform distributions yield very similar 
results especially in the inner 60 to 80 per cent of the resulting distributions, the 
major open question is that of asymmetric distributions. Since the assumptions 
defined by the Austrian Central Statistical Office happened to be symmetric (as are 
the assumptions for the different world regions in Lutz (1996)) it was decided to 
leave an in-depth analysis of that issue until we encounter a well justified candidate 
for a clearly asymmetric distribution. But in principle the method works as well 
with any specific asymmetric probability distribution that the experts might choose. 
Another general issue that will not be discussed here because it relates to any 
population projection and not just to the proposed probabilistic approach (although 
the question is more apparent here) is that of a possible correlation between 
future fertility and mortality. Especially for countries that are in the midst of a 
demographic transition, there is strong evidence for such a correlation. And as 
demonstrated in Lutz et al. (1996) projection results look very different in the 
case of assumed correlation. In a country like Austria that is well advanced in 
the transition, however, there is little basis for assuming a non-zero correlation 
between fertility and mortality trends. 
Let us now address the first issue, namely the effect of the width of the confi-
dence intervals defined by experts with respect to possible future fertility, mortality, 
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Table 2. Results of the sensitivity analysis with respect to different assumed uncertainty intervals 
(Random Scenario Model) 
Assumed proportion of all cases between high and low values 
85% 95% 
Year Standard deviation 0.2 Fractile 0.8 Fractile Standard deviation 0.2 Fractile 0.8 Fractile 
A. Total population size 
2010 0.114 8.16 8.36 0.089 8.19 8.35 
2030 0.415 7.94 8.67 0.326 8.03 8.60 
2050 0.821 7.14 8.58 0.649 7.31 8.42 
B. Old-age dependency ratio 
2010 0.005 0.364 0.373 0.004 0.365 0.372 
2030 0.038 0.575 0.639 0.028 0.582 0.632 
2050 0.102 0.610 0.785 0.075 0.632 0.762 
and migration levels. Since the analysis presented above was based on the assump-
tion that the interval between the low and high values covers 90 per cent of all 
future cases, we chose for the sensitivity analysis the two alternative distributions 
in which the same intervals are supposed to cover 85 per cent and 95 per cent.8 
As can be expected, the standard deviations of the randomly drawn vital rates are 
greater in the case of 85 per cent intervals and lower in the case of 95 per cent 
intervals. 
Table 2 shows the results of this sensitivity analysis in terms of two major output 
parameters, namely, total population size and the old-age dependency ratio. For 
three selected years the table compares the standard deviations resulting from the 
three alternative models. Because output parameters can have any kind of distri-
bution and standard deviations do not sufficiently describe these distributions, the 
table also lists the 0.2 and 0.8 fractiles that encompass the inner 60 per cent of the 
distribution. 
As can be expected for all points in time, the standard deviations are largest 
and the differences between the fractiles greatest in the case of the assumption 
that only 85 per cent of all possible cases lie between the high and low values for 
each component. The 90 per cent interval shows intermediate results, while the 
95 per cent assumptions result in the smallest uncertainty range. It is interesting, 
however, that the difference between the 85 per cent case and the 90 per cent case 
is generally much larger than that between the 90 per cent and 95 per cent case. 
This holds with respect to standard deviations and fractiles for total population 
size and for the old-age dependency ratio. The reason for this lies in the fact that 
in the case of 85 per cent, there are not only more cases outside the given high-
low range, but also the tails of the normal distribution are disproportionally longer. 
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Also, it has to be kept in mind that the whole process is highly non-linear due to 
the non-linearity of mortality. As a result the differences between the 90 per cent 
and 95 per cent assumptions are insignificant by any standard. Formal t-tests on 
the Null-Hypothesis of equal means show that this hypothesis cannot be rejected 
at any period. This is even true for the difference between the 90 per cent and the 
85 per cent case. In terms of concrete population number, e.g. in 2030, the range 
of the inner 60 per cent of the uncertainty distribution of population size decreases 
from 0.73 million in case of the 85 per cent assumption, to 0.58 million for the 90 
per cent case, and 0.57 million for the 95 per cent case. In terms of the old-age 
dependency ratio these ranges are 0.064 (85 per cent), 0.050 (90 per cent), and 
0.050 (95 per cent); here the uncertainty ranges even tum out to be identical (to 3 
decimal places) for the 90 per cent and 95 per cent cases. 
Summing up the results of this sensitivity analysis, one can say that under the 
conditions of the Austrian demographic regime (which is probably not very differ-
ent from other European countries), it makes practically no difference whether the 
defined range between high and low projection assumptions is assumed to cover 90 
per cent or 95 per cent of all possible cases. In case of the 85 per cent assumption, 
the range of uncertainty increases visibly but still not very significantly. 
Let us now address the issue of the sensitivity of projection results with respect 
to different approaches in scenario generation. We introduce an auto-regressive 
component to our scenario in the following way. Let y(t) be a function that passes 
through the mean values of corresponding demographic indicators as defined by 
experts. Suppose also that a 2(T) is the variance of the scenario variable defined 
from the 90 per cent range given by experts for year T. For comparative purposes 
we created scenario z(t) in the following way: 
z(t) = y(t) + x(t) 
where x(t) is described by a first order autoregressive process: 
x(t) = ax(t - 1) + s(t) s(t) ~ N(O,a1) 
For a given autocorrelation a (in our case, when the scenario was set in 5-year 
time steps we selected a = 0.8) we computed a; in such a way that a;(T) = a 2(T), 
for time point T for which expert data are defined (e.g. 2030), using the following 
equation: 
a;(T) = a;(l - a2T)/(1 - a2) 
Table 3 presents the results of this alternative model that includes fluctuation in 
vital rates at a given autocorrelation of 0.8. This seems to be an appropriate value 
for 5-year steps (in the case of single-year steps the corresponding values would 
be in the order of 0.96) as suggested by empirical analysis of past trends in the 
U.S. (see Lee, 1998). For comparison the results of the standard random scenario 
approach are given in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Results of the alternative model with random fluctuations (based 
on 90 per cent, assumed to be between high and low values) . Results of the 
standard random scenario approach (see Table 1) are given in parentheses 
Year Standard deviation 0.2 Fractile 0.8 Fractile 
A. Total population size 
2010 0.102 (0.092) 8.18 (8.19) 8.35 (8.34) 
2030 0.267 (0.340) 8.07 (8.00) 8.53 (8.58) 
2050 0.473 (0.682) 7.44 (7.26) 8.22 (8.43) 
B. Old-age dependency ratio 
2010 0.008 (0.004) 0.362 (0.365) 0.376 (0.372) 
2030 0.027 (0.030) 0.583 (0.583) 0.629 (0.632) 
2050 0.070 (0.082) 0.635 (0.631) 0.752 (0.763) 
Because the assumptions, as defined by the Austrian Central Statistical Office, 
are based on a linear interpolation between the current vital rates and their target 
values, the implied range of uncertainty for the first projection years is extremely 
low. The alternatively-defined random process does not have this restriction and 
therefore produces greater standard deviations for approximately the first 20 years, 
as seen from the data for 2010 in Tables I and 3. This underestimation of near-
term variability in the case of linear interpolation has no impact for the longer-term 
results, but can be embarrassing to the publishing institutions if someone points 
out 2 or 3 years after publication that the current fertility rate is already outside 
the high-low range, which at this point is still extremely narrow. An easy fix for 
this is the definition of a piece-wise linear interpolation that opens up very quickly 
and then moves linearly towards the target value (as has been done by Lutz et al., 
1996). 
Beyond 2020 however, the dispersion of the alternative model with random 
fluctuations is consistently lower than with the standard random scenario model. 
The standard deviations are clearly lower for both population size and dependency 
ratio in 2030 and 2050. Looking again at the inner 60 per cent (the distance between 
the 0.2 and 0.8 fractiles) for population size the 0.58 million under the random 
scenario model compared to 0.46 million under the alternative model. For the old-
age dependency ratio the difference of 0.050 under the random scenario model 
compares to 0.046 under the alternative model. Hence, it is evident that in the 
medium to long run the random scenario model presented and recommended here 
for Austria has a consistently higher variance in the two key output parameters 
studied than the alternative model that assumes random fluctuations. This can be 
explained intuitively by the fact that the random scenario model has more persistent 
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deviations from the mean, whereas the shorter term fluctuations in the alternative 
model tend to cancel out their effects over time.9 
In summing up this sensitivity analysis exercise, one can say that the expressed 
suspicion that the random scenario approach will systematically underestimate the 
variation of output parameters does not hold in the medium and long term (and 
even not in the short term, if scenario assumptions are opened up quickly at the 
beginning). This has been demonstrated here using only Austrian data, but there 
is no reason to assume that it is not a general property. We can therefore conclude 
that the random scenario approach is clearly on the safe side in the sense that it 
does not underestimate variance in either population size or age dependency. 
4. Discussion: Can the expert-based probabilistic scenario approach be 
generally recommended to national statistical institutes? 
When recommending the change of a long-established tradition, the burden of 
proof tends to be with those suggesting the reform. With respect to population 
projections this is probably not any different. Generally, it is possible for such 
efforts to be successful if four criteria are met: 
1. The new practice must have clear advantages as compared to the current one. 
2. It should be consistent with other work done by the producing institution, and 
present an evolution along established lines rather than a discontinuity. 
3. The proposed approach should be internally consistent and based on accepted 
scientific work. 
4. It should be practical for both the users and producers, and not cost too much. 
In the following we will briefly discuss a possible application of the expert-
based random scenario approach for official national popul;:.tion projections in light 
of these four criteria. The same arguments can also be applied to international agen-
cies producing population projections, i.e., primarily the UN Population Division 
and Eurostar. 
4.1. FIRST CRITERION 
The major advantage of probabilistic population projections is that they provide the 
user with more information. This information about the likely range of uncertainty 
may not be needed by all users; as discussed above, many may be satisfied with 
just being given one best guess. But for users who are interested in the question 
of uncertainty of future trends, a probabilistic projection clearly gives more useful 
information than the usual high and low variants that do not have a clear interpreta-
tion as either a sample path or as giving the bounds of possible trends. As indicated, 
such more precise information on the degree of uncertainty is particularly relevant 
for questions for which deviations from the main variant are associated with costs 
as is the case, for example, in the social security system. It is also relevant to see that 
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different demographic indicators (such as dependency ratios) have a much more 
narrow range of uncertainty than others. For these reasons several national statis-
tical institutes have been considering the production of probabilistic projections, 
but have had difficulties settling on the appropriate methodology to do so. 
4.2. SECOND CRITERION 
There are essentially three approaches to probabilistic population projections that 
are proposed in the scientific literature: One based on the time-series analysis 
of past vital rates; one based on the analysis of past projection errors; and the 
probabilistic scenario approach based on expert opinion. It is argued here that insti-
tutionally, the third approach is the most easy to adopt for statistical offices because 
it is essentially isomorphic to their current practice. It can utilise the established 
mechanisms of expert committees that define the alternative assumptions, and it 
does not require difficult choices associated with the first two methods as to the 
length of time series on which the assumed future variance should be based, or 
specific past projections that should be assumed to have the same error as the new 
projections. These are very difficult questions to find a consensus answer because 
there are no clear criteria for choice. The random scenario approach, on the other 
hand, only requires the additional assumption that the values already defined cover 
approximately a range of 90 to 95 per cent of all future cases. This seems to corre-
spond to the intuition of most experts who say that in the specified range between 
high and low assumptions, they did not include very unlikely extreme events. 
4.3. THIRD CRITERION 
Better institutional acceptability of a method does not necessarily imply that it is 
the better method from a scientific point of view. All three approaches for assum-
ing future variation in demographic trends (time series analysis, past errors, and 
expert opinion) are based on sound scientific work, have been published in refereed 
journals, and none could be rejected on the basis of scientific scrutiny. As to the 
question of internal consistency, the first two approaches typically only derive the 
future variance from past trends, while for the assumption of the average level 
(and sometimes even the bounds), they also refer to expert opinion. This seems 
to be based on the assumption that experts are better in giving an average value 
than in giving a range of uncertainty. A verification of this assumption is difficult 
and requires future research that goes deeply into psychology and cognitive sci-
ence. The extensive literature on Delphi methods (as summarised, for example, in 
Linstone and Turoff (1975) or Adler and Ziglio (1996)) does not seem to address 
this question explicitly, and therefore cannot resolve the issue. The third approach 
presented in this paper is based on expert opinion for both the mean and the range of 
uncertainty, and may therefore in a way be considered a more consistent source of 
assumptions. But as long as there is no additional research on this issue, it remains 
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a matter of taste rather than of scientific arguments. The one condition where the 
fully expert-based approach is clearly the only viable possibility, is the case of 
countries without adequate time series data. For a large number of less developed 
countries, as well as for global-level projections, the fully expert-based approach 
is therefore the only way to go. 
4.4. FOURTH CRITERION 
The practical feasibility and cost of publishing probabilistic projections have 
two aspects: production and dissemination. Once the methodological approach is 
chosen, the additional production costs are virtually zero. The only thing required 
is a piece of software that can perform such calculations. Since proponents of 
the different approaches have functioning programs available (and presumably are 
willing to share them) this is more a question of communication than of financial 
resources. As to the presentation and publication of the results, the description of 
certain fractiles of the distribution of relevant output parameters at different points 
in time is a viable solution as demonstrated in this paper. 1° Clearly the median 
or main variant should be described in detail in the same way as it is currently 
being done. The fractiles could then replace the different variants in the tabulations 
and graphs. For purely educational purposes and the demonstration of the possible 
consequences of certain policies, it can sometimes be instructive to describe certain 
sample paths or specific scenarios such as 'constant fertility' or describe the impact 
of a certain trend in one component on the total outcome. The full distribution of 
simulation runs should also be kept at the producing institution, in case of specific 
questions for which the published fractiles may be too wide. 
We can concf ude that for national statistical institutes as well as for international 
agencies producing population projections, the transition from the current practice 
of variants to expert-based probabilistic projections is more a question of mental 
and institutional transition than of additional funds required or extensive publica-
tion to present the results. It is the view of the authors that the randomized scenario 
approach presented in this paper for the case of Austria is a good candidate to 
facilitate this mental and institutional transition because it is a direct extension of 
current practice. 
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Notes 
1 In this respect the projections produced by Eurostat in 1991, which only present two scenarios 
without telling the users which one to use, has presumably made a number of users unhappy, since 
their most recent projections do include a medium projection ('Benchmark Scenario'). 
2 The same is often true if national projections are considered to result from aggregating provincial 
projections. 
3 For lack of convincing alternatives, experts tend to choose symmetric distributions as the simplest 
case. In case of the assumption of non-symmetry, other probability distributions can be chosen. 
4 Of course, the specific age patterns of fertility, mortality, and migration also present additional 
sources of uncertainty. But since they tend to be of only secondary importance in European countries, 
the Austrian projections assume constant age patterns. 
5 This implies the assumption that the anticipated uncertainty range of fertility does not further 
increase over time, the validity of which can certainly be discussed. While under a time-series 
approach one might expect further increasing variance, this need not necessarily be the case for 
expert views on random scenarios. 
6 Actually, life expectancy was the only variable where the committee initially did not define three 
values but only the central and high values, because a low scenario was not intended for calculation. 
Hence for the purpose of this probabilistic projection, the low values were assumed as being symme-
trical to the high values. 
7 An expert group consisting of demographers from the Austrian Statistical Office and the authors 
defined the additional assumptions that for fertility and mortality, 90 per cent of all paths should 
lie between the high and low values, but only 67 per cent for migration due to a higher perceived 
uncertainty. 
8 Alternatively, this could also be expressed by different intervals still covering 90 per cent. 
9 A new attempt to prove this analytically at least in the asymptotic case is presently under work. 
10 If users are interested in certain specific parameters or indicators that are not published, they 
should be able to derive them easily in electronic form from the data bank (storing all simulation 
results) of the institution producing the projection. 
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